Quantum and classical advantage distillation are not equivalent by Kaszlikowski, Dagomir et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
10
15
6v
1 
 2
6 
O
ct
 2
00
3
Quantum and classical advantage
distillation are not equivalent
Dagomir Kaszlikowski1, Lim Jenn Yang1,
Kwek Leong Chuang2,1, Berthold-Georg Englert1
1Department of Physics, National University of Singapore,
Singapore 117542, Singapore
2National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore 639798, Singapore
(24 October 2003)
Abstract
We report that, for the generation of a secure cryptographic key
from correlations established through a noisy quantum channel, the
quantum and classical advantage distillation procedures are not equiv-
alent, when coherent eavesdropping attacks are duly taken into ac-
count. The quantum procedure can tolerate markedly more noise in
the channel than the classical procedure.
One of the important problems in quantum cryptography is whether clas-
sical methods of key distillation are equivalent to quantum methods. This
problem was recently investigated for a certain class of protocols in Refs.
[1, 2, 3]. It was concluded there that the quantum entanglement distillation
[4] tolerates exactly the same amount of errors in a raw cryptographic key
as classical advantage distillation [5]. The analysis was carried out under the
assumption that Eve performs the most general incoherent attack.
In this short note [6] we report that this equivalence is only apparent, in
fact classical advantage distillation is not as powerful as quantum entangle-
ment distillation. This is so because Eve has the option of coherent attacks
1
which give her more information than what she can get from incoherent at-
tacks. Roughly speaking, Eve exploits the classical information she gains
from the public communication exchanged between Alice and Bob as part of
the advantage distillation protocol.
Alice sends qunits to Bob, that is n-dimensional quantum systems, and
the raw key sequence consists of the paired nit values for matching measure-
ment bases. The security of the protocols of [1, 2, 3] for quantum cryptogra-
phy can be expressed solely in terms of the probability β0 that Alice and Bob
get the same nit value if the bases match. (We are adopting the notation
of Ref. [1].) For an ideal noiseless quantum channel, one has β0 = 1, and
β0 = 1/n obtains for a channel that has nothing but unbiased noise. Chan-
nels with some admixture of noise are characterized by β0 values between
those extremes.
The lesson of Refs. [7, 2, 1] is that classical advantage distillation can be
performed successfully if
β0 >
2
2 + (n− 1) ≡ β
(inc)
0 (old threshold) (1)
which is also the threshold for quantum entanglement distillation [4]. This
result is valid provided that incoherent eavesdropping attacks supply as much
information as possible. This assumption is not implausible, inasmuch as
Gisin and Cirac [8], and Wang [9] argued that coherent eavesdropping attacks
cannot be more powerful than incoherent ones.
In the context of advantage distillation, however, there is a self-suggesting
coherent attack that truly outperforms the best incoherent attack. Instead
of measuring her ancillas one by one, Eve performs a collective measurement
on a naturally chosen subset. We analyzed this scenario in full and find that
the threshold of (1) is too optimistic. Rather, the true threshold is given by
β0 >
2
2 + (3−
√
5)(n− 1) ≡ β
(coh)
0 (new threshold). (2)
This is a substantially more stringent condition on β0 than the one in (1)
that is derived for incoherent attacks only; see Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Threshold values β
(thr)
0 for incoherent attacks (β
(thr)
0 = β
(inc)
0 ,
dashed line) and coherent attacks (β
(thr)
0 = β
(coh)
0 , solid line), for 2 ≤ n ≤ 25.
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